It wasn't just the credit insurers

Insurers and indeed suppliers got nervous and in 2008 Coface was the first to lower the level of cover it provided, yet others stuck with the retailing giant - at varying degrees.We mainly supply professional craftspeople with wholesale turquoise beads from china, Comet certainly got credit, and trade supplier debt in 2011 stood at around 109m.

Electrical & IT retail are facing challenging times but when service levels drop and consumers stay away - or worse, get street-savvy and avoid dogged selling of extended and expensive warranties - just one or two big blows can be severely damaging, more so when there is added pressure to reduce costs by re-structuring stores and laying off staff.

Comet’s "additional" income from its financial services, extended warranty commissions and rents receivable (and these are calculated separately to direct sales) declined massively from a peak of 54m in 2008 down to a measly 185,000 in April 2011 – small wonder it was struggling.

Comet was successful in the early years, so much so that it moved into the store locations of former electronics giant Rumbelows when Thorn EMI called it a day in electrical and computer retailing. Other Rumbelows stores were sold to German PC retail chain Escom,Interlocking security cable ties with 250 pound strength makes this ideal for restraining criminals. which subsequently moved to bankruptcy and closure.

The problem was that Comet, like most other traditional electronics retailers, didn't move with the times. A quick look at the profile of London's Tottenham Court Road backs this up. Comet was caught out by lower-priced web rivals, and didn't have sufficient pull in-store to lure customers.

Kesa made efforts to turn business around by revamping stores, cutting headcount and adding new marketing concepts. These included a deal with Cashstar, the launch of the eGift card programme and an interactive app developed by Grapple Mobile to "enhance" the consumer shopping experience.

In the year ended 2011, Kesa also wrote off some 20m of long-term loans owed to it, converting this to equity. This and other write-offs in the year were clearly a case of house-cleaning for eventual sale.

Credit insurance and supplier credit was there, even if at lower levels and quite possibly secured through parent guarantees from Kesa. Once it became clear Kesa intended to sell the business, the stance of suppliers and insurers changed and cover may have been cut to a degree. When Kesa did sell - in November last year - cover was pulled totally, understandably so.

Insurers and suppliers complained of not being provided with fresh financial information or business plans moving forward by OpCapita, the buyers. Landlords faced with requests to cut or defer lease payments were also denied this information.

It is linked to Merchant Equity Partners that failed spectacularly with the acquisition of the MFI Retail division out of administration a few years back.A stone mosaic stands at the spot of assasination of the late Indian prime minister.

Operational turnaround is the ability to spot immediate return and further gain in re-energising a troubled business and selling it on. Some focus on struggling firms for a quick killing and any subsequent turnaround is merely a bonus, if it happens.

OpCapita purchased Comet for a notional 2 and was handed a dowry of around 50m from Kesa, effectively covering potential extended warranty liabilities. This seemingly went straight up into the acquiring holding company and not directly back into Comet’s coffers.The oreck XL professional air purifier, It managed to trade on restricted credit and no insurance cover by reducing inventory substantially, but could only do this for a limited period of time.Interlocking security cable tie with 250 pound strength makes this ideal for restraining criminals.

Game Group reported a pre-tax loss of some 54m for the six-month period to July 2011 - and also was not covered by credit insurers.

So with potential Comet investors facing down OpCapita's fairly poor track record and, more importantly, its lack of transparency in terms of funding, financial information and business plans, the blame for Comet's failure may lie closer to the VC than the credit insurers.

Hiring reputable people as CEOs to simply talk to insurers and suppliers is not enough. They want 100 per cent clarity and real indication of investment and plans moving forward. This has to be visible, tangible and proven, not hearsay.

Limitation of cover hurts, but faced with worsening performance and financial strength, what lender would not cut their exposure? Retail has suffered immense losses in recent years - first Woolworths, then Peacocks, Zavvi and Focus DIY and now Comet - but it really is down to these businesses to work hard in halting worsening performance, showing above all transparency and a will to work with primary external stakeholders to ease pressure and aid transition.

Successful business rescues are common but only work where confidence, clarity and quality of information sharing with required and relevant partners is evident. But none of these things was present with the acquisition of Comet.